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Damages for Injury to Feelings in Malicious
Prosecution and Abuse of Process
A. M. Witte*
N ARROWLY DEFINED, the tort of malicious prosecution' occurs
when a person initiates criminal proceedings against an
innocent person for an improper purpose and without probable
cause, if the criminal proceedings terminate favorably for the
wronged person.2 The tort has been extended to include the
initiation of a civil proceeding under similar circumstances, al-
though England and a large minority of American jurisdictions
adhere to a "special injury" rule, permitting recovery for the
malicious prosecution of civil proceedings only when they inter-
fere directly with the person (e.g., lunacy, contempt or bastardy
proceedings) or with property interests (e.g., attachment, gar-
nishment or bankruptcy proceedings).3 Closely akin is the tort
of abuse of process, which occurs when legal process is used to
accomplish an improper purpose.
4
These torts are not subjects which have traditionally ex-
cited the special interest of either law students or their profes-
sors, nor does there appear to be any particular reason why they
should do so. According to Green, there is "no other cause of
action which is more carefully guarded";5 consequently, the
number of reported cases has seldom risen above a steady
trickle. Further, anyone faced with an immediate need for in-
formation will find all of the relevant aspects of these torts fully
dealt with in recent and readily available texts.6
The burden of this paper is the extent to which a plaintiff
in a malicious prosecution action will be permitted to recover
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
1 The word "malicious" in this context is in some disrepute (see generally,
Fridman, Malice in the Law of Torts, 21 Mod. L. Rev. 484 (1958)), and in
fact has been supplanted in the Restatement of Torts by the word "wrong-
ful." Courts, however, have not adopted this change.
2 Restatement, Torts, § 653 (1938).
3 Prosser, Law of Torts, § 114 (3rd ed. 1964).
4 Restatement, Torts, § 682 (1938).
5 Green, Judge and Jury, p. 338 (1930).
6 Prosser, supra, n. 3, §§ 113-115; 1 Harper & James, Law of Torts, §§ 4.1-
4.12 (1956); see also Harper, Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment and
Defamation, 15 Tex. L. Rev. 157 (1937).
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damages for the injury he has suffered to his feelings. 7 Simply
stated, there is no serious legal question presented by this broad
topic. In a malicious prosecution action based on criminal pro-
ceedings the plaintiff may recover damages for his mental suffer-
ing (and for the harm to his reputation)" and the great majority
of jurisdictions permit these damages to be recovered without
special pleading or proof-i.e., these elements are considered to
be general damages. 9 By what McCormick describes as a
"benevolent fiction," 10 these injuries are presumed to flow nec-
essarily from the malicious prosecution itself. Although there
are policy disagreements among courts concerning the proper
limits of verdicts in these actions-a matter discussed more fully
below-there is no significant dissent from the principle that
mental suffering is recoverable in this context and that, together
with the assumed injury to the plaintiff's reputation, these items
form the lion's share of the typical verdict."
It has been noted above that harm to the reputation is
treated as an item of general damages separate from mental dis-
tress. This separation seems to have only a limited significance.
When requested to review a judgment claimed to be excessive,
courts are influenced by the kind of reputation plaintiff bears;
12
otherwise, no meaningful distinction between these harms ap-
pears, loss of reputation and mental distress being clearly inter-
related.
7 Courts have been unable to settle on a single descriptive term for the
general mental harm proximately caused by a malicious prosecution. Thus
we find references in the decisions to the plaintiff's injured feelings or to
his mental suffering or anguish or distress. All of these terms are used as
synonyms for each other. Similarly, the decisions abound in more specific
references to the plaintiff's mental injury, to his shame, humiliation, em-
barrassment, etc. No effort is made to distinguish these mental states from
each other or to weigh their relative importance, if any.
8 The cases affirming this principle are too numerous to require citation.
McCormick, Law of Damages, 382 (1935).
9 Barnes v. Culver, 192 Ky. 10, 232 S. W. 39 (1921); Kirkpatrick v. Hollings-
worth, 207 Okla. 292, 249 Pac. 2d 434 (1952); Grorud v. Lossl, 48 Mont. 274,
136 Pac. 1069 (1913). See also Restatement, Torts, § 670 (1938). Pecuniary
harms, such as expenses incurred in defending the malicious proceeding, are
recoverable as special damages. Restatement, supra, n. 4, § 671.
10 McCormick, op. cit. supra, n. 8, 382.
11 Flam v. Lee, 116 Iowa 289, 90 N. W. 70, 71 (1902): "... the principal basis
of recovery in most actions of this kind is mental suffering and anguish
arising from the wrongful charge and arrest .. "
12 Davis v. Seeley, 91 Iowa 583, 60 N. W. 183 (1894); Gandy v. Palmer, 169
So. 2d 819 (Miss. 1964); also, the defendant may introduce evidence of
plaintiff's bad reputation in order to rebut the normal presumption. Kirk-
patrick v. HoUingsworth, supra, n. 9.
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The obvious result of the rule that substantial damages for
mental suffering may be awarded without special pleading or
proof is that it permits appellate courts to affirm relatively large
verdicts not only in cases where there is little or no evidence of
mental suffering, but also in cases where there is some indication
that the plaintiff in fact suffered no mental anguish at all. In
Blakely v. Roanoke State Bank,1" for example, the plaintiff "re-
turned a negative answer" to his attorney's question whether he
had felt shame as a result of being imprisoned and tried. Never-
theless, a verdict of $1700 for mental anguish was affirmed, the
court refusing to believe that the plaintiff was "wholly uncon-
scious of the disgrace that ordinarily attaches to arrest and im-
prisonment." 14 The rule also safeguards the plaintiff who is
either unable to describe his mental condition with anything
approaching clarity and completeness or who is taciturn by
nature.15
Although the plaintiff need not plead or prove his mental
suffering, he is by and large permitted to testify about all mental
reactions proximately caused by the malicious prosecution.16
This testimony is usually of two kinds, both highly formalized.
The plaintiff may testify in general terms that he felt shame or
humiliation or embarrassment as a result of the malicious prose-
cution-general mental states which in any event would be as-
sumed to follow. The plaintiff may also testify regarding more
-1 122 Kan. 810, 253 P. 544 (1927).
14 Id. at 546.
15 In Flam v. Lee, supra, n. 11, at 71, the court said: "In this same connec-
tion may be taken up the objections raised to plaintiff's attempt to describe
his mental suffering while in custody. We know of no rule of law which
prohibits such testimony. It is true, perhaps, the jury may properly be left
to infer such sufferings from the circumstances of his situation, and it is
also true that the average witness finds it difficult to describe mental con-
ditions in apt terms. But does it follow that such description, when made,
is not proper evidence? If a man who has been wrongfully prosecuted for
crime feels a sense of shame and humiliation that such a charge should
be laid at his door, or that he has been disgraced in the eyes of his neigh-
bors and friends, or is tormented with fear that his incarceration in jail
may bring sorrow and disgrace to his home, we think he should be per-
mitted to say it."
16 Ibid. Note, however, that there is authority to the effect that the plain-
tiff may not testify directly that he suffered mental anguish, although he
may describe the circumstances of his arrest and confinement (thus per-
mitting the jury to infer mental anguish). Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Cleveland, 169 Ala. 131, 53 So. 80 (1910); Walling v. Fields, 209 Ala. 389, 96
So. 471 (1923).
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1966
15 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
specific incidents of mental suffering; he is distressed because of
his family's reaction, humiliated and upset by the reaction of his
friends, neighbors and by his confinement in jail, if any and how-
ever brief. For example, the plaintiff may testify that he suffered
mental anguish while in jail because he was unable to attend his
sick child at home,'" because his mother fainted when he was
taken into custody,' because he was shunned by former friends
and acquaintances, 19 or humiliated by their references to his
confinement, 20 because he was humiliated by being fingerprinted
and mugged,21 depressed by the sheer experience of being in
jail,22 and worried about his job security.23 It is generally
agreed, however, that the plaintiff may not recover from the
defendant in a malicious prosecution action for injured feelings
resulting from mistreatment by the police or his jail mates;
incidents of harassment while the plaintiff is in custody are re-
garded as outside the scope of the defendant's wrongful con-
duct. 2
4
It is interesting that persons injured by a malicious prose-
cution do not attempt to recover for future or long-term mental
suffering nor attempt to testify regarding possible embarrass-
ments subsequent to the successful termination of the malicious-
ly instituted proceedings.25 Quite probably there is a balancing
out of assumptions here: the person of ordinary sensibility will
experience no substantial mental suffering once the proceedings
17 Davis v. Seeley, supra, n. 12.
18 Flam v. Lee, supra, n. 11. The court in this case emphasized that the
plaintiff was not recovering for his mother's anguish or other injury.
19 Polk v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 351 Mo. 865, 174 S. W. 2d 176
(1943); Randol v. Kline's, Inc., 330 Mo. 343, 49 S. W. 2d 112 (1932) (only
one dinner invitation in six years).
20 Redman v. Hudson, 124 Ark. 26, 186 S. W. 312 (1916).
21 Irons v. American Ry. Express Co., 318 Mo. 318, 300 S. W. 283 (1927).
22 Flam v. Lee, supra, n. 11; Kirkpatrick v. Hollingsworth, supra, n. 9; Fry
v. Bank of America National Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 142 Cal. App. 2d 150, 298
P. 2d 34 (Dist. Ct. App., 3rd Dist., 1956); Stoecker v. Nathanson, 5 Neb. 435,
98 N. W. 1061 (1904).
23 Dwyer v. McClean, 133 Ind. App. 454, 175 N. E. 2d 50 (1961).
24 Flam v. Lee, supra, n. 11; Redman v. Hudson, supra, n. 20; Duckwall v.
Davis, 194 Ind. 670, 142 N. E. 113 (1924) (unless the defendant provoked
the mistreatment or should have known it was likely to occur).
25 In Cramer v. Barmon, 136 Mo. App. 673, 118 S. W. 1179 (1909), the court
held that the plaintiff could recover for mental distress suffered during a
continuance of the criminal case, although the plaintiff had requested the
continuance in order to prepare his defense.
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have terminated in his favor. 26 There is also no technique used
in these actions analogous to the per diem method of proving
pain. As a result, the decisions in cases where the defendant
argues that the verdict is excessive reflect contradictory atti-
tudes, based, it would seem, upon inconsistent judicial views
regarding the value of malicious prosecution actions and the
sacredness of the jury's verdict.
Some decisions fail to give any clue to the reasons for the
action taken by the court, as in Warren v. Balaker27 in which a
$1000 verdict was reduced to $500 per curiam. Some decisions
suggest that a relatively low ceiling will be permitted. In a re-
cent Connecticut decision, for example, the trial judge awarded
a total of $400 to a plaintiff who spent $200 defending the mali-
cious prosecution proceeding and who was described as having
lost time and business and suffered humiliation.28 In Exchange
National Bank of Colorado Springs v. Cullum, 29 the court
seemed uneasy about affirming a verdict of $2500 compensatory
damages ("while this verdict may seem unusually large"), al-
though the plaintiff was described as a man of standing and,
presumably, of exceptional character and reputation, a retired
officer whose pension had been jeopardized, who had lost time
and business, had incurred travel expenses and the cost of two
bonds, and who had suffered "unusual and unnecessary" injury
to his feelings and reputation, including newspaper publicity.
At one time Indiana attempted to control malicious prose-
cution verdicts by imposing a proportion formula: the damages
awarded for injury to the feelings, reputation and social stand-
ing must bear some reasonable ratio to the pecuniary losses in-
26 It was held in Black v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 218 F. 239 (W.D. N.Y. 1914)
affd. 230 F. 798 (2d Cir. 1916) that the mental suffering of an intelligent,
industrious and honest man was not to be measured by a different standard
than the mental suffering of a man of larger earning capacity; it was also
suggested that the poorer man might suffer a greater injury to his feelings
and reputation than a wealthier man who might be better able to over-
come the force of a malicious prosecution action. In Irons v. American Ry.
Express Co., 318 Mo. 318, 300 S. W. 283 (1927), the court was unimpressed
with the argument that an inoffensive hobo was not entitled to a large
verdict for these injuries because of his low social standing (plaintiff had
ridden freight trains without obtaining the consent of the railroad).
27 247 App. Div. 766, 285 N. Y. S. 850 (1936); see also Dunn v. City of New
York, 23 App. Div. 2d 660, 257 N. Y. S. 2d 29 (1965): $10,000 verdict reduced
to $2,500, no facts or reasons given.
28 Rizza v. Gill, 24 Conn. Supp. 256, 189 A. 2d 794 (1963).
29 114 Colo. 26, 161 P. 2d 336 (1945).
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curred,30 but this formula was questioned and apparently aban-
doned in a more recent decision. 31 The "reasonable ratio" ap-
proach seems to have resulted from a blending of two principles:
the familiar rule that punitive damages should be reasonably
proportionate to the actual damages, 32 and the minority rule that
compensatory or actual damages in malicious prosecution cases
are limited to pecuniary losses, whereas non-pecuniary losses,
such as injured feelings and reputation, are classified as punitive
damages.33 Labeling damages for non-pecuniary losses as puni-
tive or exemplary seems basically confused.
The bulk of the decisions in malicious prosecution actions
where it is claimed the verdict is excessive do not yield any
definite standard or criterion for predicting results.34 In Levine
v. Mills,3 5 the court remarked that malicious prosecution cases
are not "favored in the law," that large verdicts should be
viewed with more concern and examined more carefully than
in other tort cases so that people would not be inhibited in
seeking legal relief.
Frequently, however, comparatively large verdicts for injury
to the feelings and reputation are affirmed as against a claim the
award is excessive. In Fry v. Bank of America National Trust
& Say. Ass'n,36 for example, a wife was arrested and spent one
night in jail before being released; the story was carried on the
front page of the local newspaper. Her expenses in defending
the charge were paid for by her husband and he recovered them
from the defendant. The jury awarded the wife $15,000 compen-
satory damages and $10,000 punitive damages and the verdict
was affirmed, the court simply stating it found neither "passion
or prejudice." A $30,000 award for injured feelings and reputa-
30 Bangert v. Hubbard, 127 Ind. App. 579, 126 N. E. 2d 778 (1955).
31 Dwyer v. McClean, 133 Ind. App. 454, 175 N. E. 2d 50 (1961).
32 Gordon v. McLearn, 123 Ark. 496, 185 S. W. 803 (1916); Soesbe v. Lines,
180 Iowa 943, 164 N. W. 129 (1917); McCormick, op. cit. supra, n. 8 at 298.
33 Bangert v. Hubbard, supra, n. 30. See also Streetman v. Lasater, 185
S. W. 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
34 There is an exhaustive collection of cases in 35 A. L. R. 2d 308.
35 114 A. 2d 546 (Mun. Ct. App. D. C. 1955); in W. T. Grant Co. v. Taylor,
223 Ky. 812, 4 S. W. 2d 741 (1928) the court remarked: "Actions for ma-
licious prosecution are not favored in law, since public policy favors the
exposure of crime, and large verdicts in such actions should be viewed
with more concern than similar verdicts in other cases involving tortious
acts." 4 S. W. 2d at 745.
36 Supra, note 22.
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tion was affirmed in Miller v. Schnitzer37 after the court con-
cluded its judicial conscience was not shocked by that amount
after reviewing the record. In one case an award of $10,000 ac-
tual and $15,000 punitive damages was not even challenged as
excessive . 8
Since there is clearly no objective standard available for
estimating these injuries, the conventional formulas used by
courts in reviewing excessive damages cases-e.g., does the ver-
dict reflect passion or prejudice? does it shock the court's con-
science?-amount to no more than an admission all such deci-
sions are totally ad hoc. In short, the plaintiff's attorney must
determine in each case the most effective method of reconstruct-
ing his client's distress, both real and assumed, not only to per-
suade the jury in the first instance, but also to protect the ver-
dict on appeal.
There are a number of significant differences in malicious
prosecution actions based on the wrongful initiation of civil pro-
ceedings. According to the prevailing view, no damages will be
assumed; the plaintiff in the malicious prosecution action must
allege and prove all actual damages suffered in excess of the
costs recoverable in the original action.39 Although there is vir-
tually no discussion in the cases of the rationale for this position,
it is likely based on the assumption that the run of the mill civil
action-though maliciously instituted--does not necessarily in-
jure the reputation and feelings of the defendant in that action.
Thus, in Harter v. Lewis Stores, 40 the plaintiff alleged that she
had been maliciously prosecuted by the defendant in a simple
contract action brought by the defendant for the unpaid balance
of her account. The court held that the plaintiff's damages
should be limited to loss of time and litigation expenses and that
37 78 Nev. 301, 371 P. 2d 824 (1962). The jury's total verdict amounted to
$95,000: $15,000 for special injuries, $30,000 for injured feelings, etc., and
$50,000 punitive damages. The court reduced the $15,000 verdict to $8,000,
after finding no evidence of special injuries above that amount and reduced
the $50,000 punitive award to $5,000 after concluding that-given the de-
fendant's wealth-the lower figure was sufficient punishment. In Dwyer v.
McClean, supra, n. 31, a $13,700 verdict was affirmed although the evidence
showed only $375 pecuniary damages. See also Randol v. Kline's, Inc.,
supra, n. 19.
38 Singleton v. Perry, 45 Cal. 2d 489, 289 P. 2d 794 (1955).
39 McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538 (1882); Carbondale Inv. Co. v. Bur-
dick, 67 Kan. 329, 72 P. 781 (1903); Restatement, Torts, § 681 (1938); Pros-
ser, supra, n. 3 § 114.
40 240 S. W. 2d 86 (Ky. 1951).
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there could be no recovery for her mental suffering since her
reputation had not been assailed nor her person or property
interfered with. The unspoken premise here seems to be that
a person of ordinary sensibility would not feel shame, embar-
rassment and so on merely at being named a defendant in a civil
action.
The rule is otherwise, however, if the civil action com-
plained of carries with it defamatory implications or interferes
with the plaintiff's person or property.41 Wrongfully instituted
lunacy proceedings are a handy example, for normally such pro-
ceedings involve both injury to reputation and incarceration;
wrongful attachments or garnishments necessarily involve inter-
ference with property. In these and similar cases, damages for
injured feelings are normally recoverable. 42
Judicial attitudes regarding verdicts in this class of cases
are even less predictable than in criminal actions. In Gore v.
Gorman's, Inc.,43 for example, the plaintiff sought damages re-
sulting from the defendant's wrongful garnishment of wages for
a debt which had been discharged in bankruptcy. He received
nothing for his alleged embarrassment and mortification, the
court refusing to believe that a bankrupt would actually be that
sensitive. In Dauphine v. Herbert,44 the court contended that a
40 year old Negro woman was entitled to $285 damages for the
humiliation and embarrassment suffered from confinement for
five days in a mental hospital pursuant to a maliciously insti-
41 Restatement, Torts, § 681, Comment (b): ". . . an action based upon the
alleged fraudulent conduct of the defendant is in its nature defamatory.
In a word, the test is whether the defendant's pleadings are such that if
not protected by the privilege of a litigant . . . they would be actionable
under the rules which govern recovery for defamation." See also Comment
(d), supra.
42 A highly selective list of cases permitting recovery for mental suffering
in these circumstances follows: Cohn v. Saidel, 71 N. H. 558, 53 A. 800
(1902) (wrongful attachment); Brooking v. Lemon, 96 A. 2d 849 (Mun. Ct.
App. D. C. 1953) (wrongful notice to quit); Barbish v. Ohio Finance Co.,
101 N. E. 2d 792 (Ohio 1951) (wrongful garnishment); McAnarney v. Com-
monwealth Loan Co., 208 S. W. 2d 480 (Mo. 1948) (wrongful garnishment);
Alexander v. Alexander, 131 F. Supp. 605 (W. D. D. C. So. Car. 1955),
rev'd. 229 F. 2d 111 (4th Cir. 1956) (lunacy proceedings); Dauphine v.
Herbert, 37 So. 2d 829 (Ct. App. La. 1948) (lunacy proceedings); Pickles v.
Anton, 49 N. D. 47, 189 N. W. 684 (1922) (lunacy proceedings).
43 143 F. Supp. 9 (W. D. D. C. Mo. 1956).
44 37 So. 2d 829 (Ct. App. La. 1948). The court expressly stated that a per-
son of low social status might very well overlook the embarrassment and
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tuted insanity proceeding. At the other end of the scale we have
Alexander v. Alexander,45 a case in which the jury awarded the
plaintiff $175,000 actual damages and $75,000 punitive damages,
the defendant (her husband) having wrongfully instituted
lunacy proceedings against her. Although the reported facts in
the case do not show whether the plaintiff suffered any pecu-
niary losses, it is apparent that the bulk of the award was for
her "shame, humiliation and disgrace." 46
The Alexander verdict stands alone and there are not
enough decisions in this area to justify generalizations about the
future. The available decisions suggest that injured feelings are
not compensated in maliciously instituted civil actions on the
same scale as they are in criminal actions, with a correlation
based roughly on the assumption that the plaintiff's reputation
is less harmed by his being involved in a civil action than in a
criminal proceeding. 47
Some confusion and apparent contradictions have resulted
from the possible overlapping of causes of action in cases where
process (e.g., attachment, garnishment, execution) has either
wrongfully issued or been used oppressively. For example, an
attachment may have been issued against the wrong person. In
this circumstance, the attachment defendant may have a cause
of action against the attachment plaintiff without the necessity
of showing malice and want of probable cause, but the recover-
45 131 F. Supp. 605 (W. D. D. C. So. Car. 1955).
46 131 F. Supp. at p. 607. Although the trial judge reduced the award of
actual damages to $87,500, he did so merely in the exercise of discretion,
not because the court's conscience was shocked. The award of $75,000
punitive damages was described as conservative. The judgment was re-
versed on other grounds. 229 F. 2d 111 (4th Cir. 1956). This is the only
case found in which future mental suffering was alluded to ("a lifetime of
shame").
47 The following might be loosely described as "typical" verdicts: Giordano
v. Tullier, 139 So. 2d 15 (Ct. App. La. 1962) ($7,500 for humiliation, embar-
rassment and harm to reputation reduced to $3,000, no "convincing" evi-
dence of mental anguish); Jones v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 239 Mo. App.
331, 186 S. W. 2d 879 (1945) (repeated garnishments-plaintifi received
$500 for anxiety over job security and humiliation); Brooking v. Lemon,
96 A. 2d 849 (Mun. Ct. App. D. C. 1953) (wrongful notice to quit-$250
awarded for anguish resulting from the threatened loss of one's home).
Blankenship v. Staton, 348 S. W. 925 (1961) is of special interest. In re-
versing a verdict of $20,000 for mental suffering in a wrongful attachment,
the court, at p. 929, said: ". . . we have by way of evidence only the gen-
eral statements of the Statons that they were humiliated and embarrassed
and the statement of Mrs. Staton that she became highly nervous so as to
require medical treatment. This evidence is purely subjective and does not
produce the conviction that great suffering has been evidenced. The stand-
ard of damages in Kentucky for items of this nature has not been high."
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able damages ordinarily do not include compensation for injured
feelings.48 If circumstances evidencing malice, want of probable
cause, etc., are added, the attachment defendant has a cause of
action for malicious prosecution of a civil proceeding (the attach-
ment proceeding), with damages for injured feelings recoverable
as noted above.49 Although there is some authority permitting
recovery for injured feelings absent malice,50 the distinction
seems sound: a defective, although "good faith" wrongful attach-
ment or garnishment, seems more akin to conversion of property
where conventionally damages are limited to pecuniary losses.51
Abuse of process, as defined at the outset, occurs when
process is used to accomplish an improper purpose. Technically,
this tort may include fact situations which also contain the ele-
ments essential to a malicious prosecution action; in other words,
process might have been issued maliciously, without probable
cause and so on, and also for an improper purpose. 52 If a choice
between abuse of process and malicious prosecution need be
made, the former seems by and large preferable, for the cause
of action can be established by showing the improper purpose;
neither probable cause nor unfavorable termination are defenses
to liability.53
48 Mills v. Liquidators, 206 Ore. 212, 288 P. 2d 1060 (1955); Anderson v.
Sloane, 72 Wis. 566, 40 N. W. 214 (1888); Stone v. C. I. T. Corp., 122 Pa.
Super. 71, 184 A. 674 (1936); Lee v. Dunbar, 37 A. 2d 178 (Mun. Ct. App.
D. C. 1944). Some jurisdictions do not recognize the cause of action absent
malice: Finn v. Witherbee, 126 Cal. App. 2d 45, 271 P. 2d 606 (1954); Fish
v. Nethercutt, 14 Wash. 582, 45 P. 44 (1896).
49 In addition, the attachment defendant will usually have a statutory
cause of action on the bond normally required of the attachment plaintiff.
See Brown v. Guaranty Estates Corp., 239 No. Car. 595, 80 S. E. 2d 645(1954) for a comprehensive discussion of this alternative.
50 Williams v. Hill, Harris & Co., Inc., 190 So. 157 (Ct. App. La., 1939).
Some cases are ambiguous on the question whether malice and lack of
probable cause are essential in order to recover for injured feelings: e.g.,
Hyde v. Southern Grocery Stores, 197 So. Car. 263, 15 S. E. 2d 353 (1941);
Wright v. Husband, 193 Ark. 347, 99 S. W. 2d 583 (1936) (attachment plain-
tiff "willful," "rude and insulting").
51 McCormick, supra, n. 8 §§ 109 and 123.
52 See Brown v. Guaranty Estates Corp., supra, for a discussion of this pos-
sibility. See also, McGann v. Allen, 105 Conn. 177, 134 A. 810 (1926).
53 Restatement, Torts, § 682 (1938). Some authorities use the term "mali-
cious use of process" in this context but it seems clear that this term is a
synonym for malicious prosecution as used herein. 72 C. J. S. Process,
§ 120 at p. 1195 (1951). No comprehensive definition of the phrase "im-
proper purpose" is possible. In Prosser's view, the ulterior purpose "usual-
ly takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly
involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the
payment of money, by the use of the process as a threat or a club." Pros-
(Continued on next page)
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It is necessary to show some actual damage in order to make
out a cause of action for abuse of process: that is, some degree
of interference with the plaintiff's person or property must be
established.54 Once a cause of action is shown, however, dam-
ages for injured feelings may be recovered as a matter of
course. 55 Verdicts for this element are generally small, possibly
because juries recognize that the plaintiff would normally have
had no cause of action for any damages whatever absent the
improper purpose.
It would be pleasant-but highly misleading-to end on a
note which suggests that the cases dealing with compensation for
injured feelings in these torts reflect a comprehensive set of co-
herent principles. But even a definite and certain jurisprudence
of liability here would not solve that most unyielding problem:
how to measure in money the individual's interest in mental
stability?
(Continued from preceding page)
ser, supra, n. 3 § 115. See also, George v. Leonard, 71 F. Supp. 662 (E. D.
D. C. So. Car. 1947). Although there are decisions to the effect that "mal-
ice" is an essential element of the tort of abuse of process-e.g., Robert &
St. John Motor Co. v. Bumpass, 65 S. W. 2d 399 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1933)
-it should be noted that "malice" in this context is only a shorthand refer-
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